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Abstract 
Abstract of thesis entitled: 
This thesis is an empirical investigation of the duration of 
exchange-rate pegs in 9 Asian countries. We use logit analysis to 
identify factors that may explain these peg durations. This result 
complements that in Klein and Marion (1997) who investigated the 
duration of exchange-rate pegs in 16 Latin American countries and 
Jamaica. As in Klein and Marion (1997), we find that the real 
exchange rate to US, the level of international liquidity, openness 
of the economy and its geographical trade concentration 
significantly influence the likelihood of a devaluation in Asian 
countries. However, different from Klein and Marion (1997), there 
is no evidence that the likelihood of a devaluation in Asian 
countries first rises and subsequently declines during the first year 
of a peg. We also find that definition of exchange rate pegs plays a 
critical role in the analysis of Asian currencies devaluation. 
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Exchange-rate pegs are not permanent since no single currency regime 
is right for all countries or at all times. (Frankel (1999，P.l)) 
Governments often devalue a currency or abandon attempts to peg altogether when 
facing adverse circumstances. Since 1960s, most Asian currencies were pegged to the 
U.S. dollar. When the Bretton Woods System was abolished in 1973, the US dollar 
devalued against gold by 10% and was very volatile. Subsequently, these Asian countries 
switched from a peg with the US dollar to a peg with a basket of its major trading 
partner's currencies around 1970s. However, persistent inflation differentials between 
Asian countries and the economies, to which their currency pegged, provided great 
devaluation pressure to these Asian currencies. Abandoning a peg is politically costly 
and therefore policy-makers are often unwilling to undertake such measure too often. 
Here is a typical devaluation for adjustment pattern for Asian countries, govern-
‘ merits tried to avoid great devaluation by allowing their currencies to devalue by less 
than 0.5% per month. In some cases, after a continuous small adjustment for about 6 
months, the adjustment magnitude may increase to 1%. Subsequently but suddenly, 
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this currency may undergo great devaluation by more than 10%. 
Different from fixed exchange-rate pegs in Latin America, whose currencies were 
pegged to the US dollar only, Asia's exchange rate against the US dollar might adjust 
even during a peg. This is so because most Asian currencies are often pegged to a 
basket of currencies. In section 3，we describe in details the trend and movement of 
Asian currencies between 1960 and 1999. Exchange-rate pegs used in our analysis are 
defined. 1 
In this thesis, we try to explain the duration of Asian pegs using macroeconomic 
variables. Since there are fundamental differences between Asian pegs and Latin Amer-
ican pegs, we also provide a comparative analysis of the duration of East Asian and 
Latin American exchange-rate pegs. 
Our study is inspired by Klein and Marion (1997). Klein and Marion investigated 
the duration of exchange-rate pegs in Latin American countries and Jamaica. Comple-
mentary to their studies, we focus on Asian countries and also investigate the similarities 
and differences between factors that influence peg duration in Latin America and Asia. 
Before going into the details of our empirical studies, we would like to emphasize two 
points: First, there is an important difference between crisis and devaluation. Crisis, 
often a result of speculative attack, is a cause of devaluation, but not all devaluations 
are the result of crises. There are reasons other than crisis that lead to a devaluation. 
Example of these reasons include trade promotion and maintenance of economical bal-
ance between their countries and the countries with which their currencies pegged. 
, Recent studies that focused on 1997 Asian financial crises used data only from 1990 
ipor the history of Asian currencies, see the "currencies" section of Asia Yearbook which published 
by Far Eastern Economic Review since 1960 annually. 
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to 1997. Because 1997 Asian financial crises happened once only, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to analyse it statistically. Consequently, previous studies mainly focused 
on treating 1997 Asian financial crises as a case study (e.g. Coresetti, Pesenti, Roubini 
(1998)) or using cross country analysis to investigate the causes and effects of Asian 
financial crises among the Asian countries (e.g. Tornell (1999)). In this thesis, we focus 
on devaluation in Asian countries form 1960 to 1999 instead of 1997 Asian financial 
crises only. Devaluation occurs periodically in Asian countries. We focus on nine Asian 
countries which were typical victims in the 1997 Asian financial crises, including Thai-
land, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, China and Hong 
Kong. We extracted data between 1960 and 1999 which included both the data in 1997 
Asian financial crises, just like other previous studies, and the data before 1997 Asian 
financial crises, which was ignored by most of the previous studies. We concentrate on 
factors that affect the probability of devaluation in all Asian countries as a whole and 
compare the result with similar analysis using Latin American sample by Klein and 
Marion (1997), rather than making comparison among Asian countries. 
Second, our result can be used to calculate the probability of devaluation, but 
cannot be used in predicting the timing of crises. Using logit analysis, we can see 
only the relation between the movement of investigated variables and the probability 
of devaluation. According to Tornell (1999)，who analysed financial in Asia and Latin 
America, the result from logit analysis does not imply that there is a simple relation 
between fundamentals and the timing of a crises in a given country. He explained that a 
country which has a high probability to undergo devaluation does not necessarily imply 
that it must suffer from a crisis in the near future. It only implies that if investor's 
expectations turn pessimistic, a crisis will ensue because the government will be forced 
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to close the external gap through a large depreciation, thereby justifying investor's 
expectations. To the extent that investor's expectations are unpredictable, the timing 
of crisis in a particular country is unpredictable. This explanation also applies to 
our analysis. A country that has a high probability to undergo devaluation does not 
necessarily imply the government would devalue its currency in the near future. It only 
implies that if government targets at maintain its economical balance, the pressure and 
room for devaluation is much greater. Since government policies and interventions are 
often difficult to predict, the timing of devaluation in a particular country is unlikely 
predictable with accuracy. 
In our analysis, we constructed exchange-rate peg data according to two different 
definitions, one defines exchange-rate pegs according to government announcements 
and exchange rate policies and the other uses the same percentage band definition for 
all countries. Results from these two different definitions are discussed in Chapter 6 
and 8 respectively. Extraction of important determinants such as real exchange rate 
is motivated by two believes. First, policy-makers trade off the economic costs of real 
exchange-rate misalignment against the adjustment costs incurred at the time the peg 
is abandoned (e.g. Klein and Marion (1997)). Second, speculators have a common 
set of rules to anticipate that the country will respond with a sizeable depreciation. 
Although investors do not communicate among themselves, they do not attack countries 
randomly. They instead use a common set of fundamentals and a stable filtering rule 
to predict which countries are most likely to respond with sizeable depreciation and 
then concentrate their attack on those countries. We hypothesize that the size of these 
* 
adjustment costs and the common set of rules are influenced, in part, by the economic 
variables of the economy (e.g. Tornell (1999)). According to these two believes and 
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the fundamental differences between Asian pegs and Latin American pegs, we consider 
also the variables such as current account, real exchange rate to Japan and Germany, 
foreign reserves to M2 ratio and inflation differentials in addition to the variables used 
by Klein and Marion, such as the real exchange rate to U.S., net foreign asset to M2 
ratio, openness and geographical trade concentration. 
Following Klein and Marion (1997), we use logit analysis to consider the effect of a 
variety of variables on the likelihood of a devaluation over the course of these spells of 
pegs. We compare our results with Klein and Marion (1997) to see whether variables 
significantly affect the likelihood of a devaluation in Latin America would also affect 
Asian pegs in the same way. The logit analysis yields several interesting results. Similar 
to Latin American countries, there is strong evidence that a more appreciated real 
exchange rate and a lower stock of international reserves are associated with a higher 
likelihood of a devaluation. However, Latin American countries show a greater degree 
of real appreciation during the peg on average. Openness and trade concentration have 
opposite effects in Latin American countries and Asian countries. In Asian countries, 
the more open an economy, the higher the likelihood of devaluation of its currency. 
The greater degree of geographical trade concentration, the lower the likelihood of 
devaluation. In Latin American sample, there is some evidence that the likelihood of 
a devaluation first rises and subsequently declines during the first year of a peg while 
Asian sample does not show this characteristics. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we review the related 
, literature about devaluation, including the role of macroeconomic fundamentals on the 
likelihood of devaluation and their predictive power. We try to compare the data set 
and research methodology between previous studies and our study. In Chapter 3, we 
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describe how the data set was constructed and how we define exchange-rate pegs. In 
Chapter 4, we discuss the methodology of logit analysis. In Chapter 5, we explain how 
the macroeconomic fundamentals affect the peg duration and our expected relationship 
among them. Our results and findings are reported in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, we 
investigate the probability of devaluation before actual devaluation in Asian countries. 
In Chapter 8, we discuss the robustness of our results if we define an exchange-rate peg 




A review of the related li terature 
There are many studies on currency crises and devaluation. These studies vary by 
the choice of sample periods, sample countries, research methodologies and target vari-
ables. In the following, we summarized some of the related literature and discuss the 
similarities and differences between this literature and our analysis. 
Klein and Marion (1997) identified factors that influence peg duration in Latin 
American countries using a logit analysis. Their results suggested that more appreciated 
real exchange rate and lower stock of international reserves are associated with a higher 
likelihood of devaluation. There is also strong evidence that structural factors, such 
as the openness of an economy and its geographical trade concentration, significantly 
affect the likelihood of devaluation. Political events, such as regular executive transfers, 
also significantly increase the likelihood of devaluation. Finally, there is some evidence 
of duration dependence, with the likelihood of devaluation first rising and then falling 
during the first year of a peg. 
» 
Pazarbasioglu and Otkei, (1997) estimated a survival model in order to identify the 
role of macroeconomic fundamentals on the likelihood and the timing of a currency crisis 
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for Mexico during 1982-1994. They estimated a logistic regression to determine the one-
step-ahead probability of a crisis. The empirical findings suggest that the probability 
associated with all regime changes in the sample period can be attributed to speculative 
pressures in light of some deterioration in economic fundamentals. The probability of 
devaluation was found to be increasing in the level of the central bank credit to the 
banking system (or, alternatively fiscal deficit), the loss of foreign exchange reserves 
and competitiveness (as measured by an appreciation of the real exchange rate), and 
the inflation differential with the United States. They also found that the factors which 
determine the likelihood of a crisis are different from those that determine the timing 
of the crisis. In particular, the two main factors which contributed to the timing of the 
speculative attacks appear to be the decline in the foreign exchange reserves, and the 
increase in the share of short-term foreign currency indexed debt. 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1998) studied whether exchange rate expectations and over-
valuation are predictors of currency crises. They estimated a fixed-panel regression of 
expected devaluation against different overvaluation measures. Their results suggested 
that overvaluation has predictive power in explaining the crises. However, although 
expected depreciation obtained from survey data partially takes different exchange 
rate misalignment measures into consideration, expectations fail to anticipate currency 
crises. In conclusion, they pointed out that real exchange rate is a summary variable 
and therefore, an important leading indicator of crises. In fact, as a by-product, their 
paper showed that real exchange rate misalignment is a good predictor even out of 
sample (i.e. using only past information to predict crises). 
I 
Enichenbaum and Evans (1995) investigated the effects of shocks to monetary policy 
on nominal and real US exchange rates via vector autoregression. They found strong 
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evidence that contractionary policy shocks lead to significant, persistent appreciation 
in exchange rates, both nominal and real. The negative response of interest rate differ-
entials between foreign and US to US monetary policy contributed significantly to the 
overall variability of US exchange rates in the post-Bretton Woods era. 
Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini (1998) stressed that at the root of the Asian curren-
cies and economic crises was a complex web of structural distortions and fundamental 
weaknesses. Because of moral hazard, bank borrowed heavily in foreign currencies, and 
their debt positions were often short-term and unhedged, as borrowers acted on the 
presumption that the exchange rates would remain stable, and they would be bailed-
out if things went wrong. When indeed things went wrong and a series of domestic and 
external shocks revealed the low profitability of past investments, the shaky founda-
tions of investment strategies in the region emerged, and currency and financial crises 
appeared inextricably intertwined. 
Berg and Pattillo (1998) evaluated three different pre-1997 economic models for 
predicting currency crises. They found that if these models were used in late 1996, they 
would have been able to predict the Asian crisis, but not very well since none of these 
models reliably predicts the timing of crises, that is, whether there would be crises in 
1997. Their models may give insight into the nature and causes of crises independently 
and their value as predictors. They demonstrated that the probability of a currency 
crisis increases when domestic credit growth is high, the bilateral real exchange rate is 
overvalued relative to trend, and reserves account deficit tends to precede crises. 
Tornell (1999) found that the same model that explains the spread of the crisis in 
1995 also explains the cross-country variation in the 1997 crisis. His finding explained 
why in 1995 the hardest hit countries were in Latin American, but in 1997, the South 
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East Asian countries were hit hardest. Prior to the Tequila crisis, Latin American 
countries, on average, had bigger lending booms and more severe real appreciation 
than South East Asian countries. Interestingly, the opposite is true for the period 
preceding the 1997 Asian crises. However, they also stated that their finding does 
not imply that there is a simple relation between fundamentals and the timing of a 
crisis in a given country. The fact that a country is vulnerable does not imply that 
it must suffer a crisis in the near future. It only implies that if investors expectation 
turn pessimistic, a crisis will ensue because the government will be forced to close the 
external gap through a large depreciation, thereby justifying investor's expectation. 
They also strongly emphasize the extent of investor's expectation are unpredictable, 
the timing of a crisis in a particular country is unpredictable. 
Milesi and Razin (1997) suggested that the likelihood of external crises has to be 
related to a composite set of factors, rather than relying on the robustness of individual 
indicator. Their interpretation of the evidence presented for limited sample of country 
episodes is that the interest rate burden of external obligations and their composition 
interact with macroeconomic and structural factors, such as the level of savings and 
investment, the degree of openness, the level and flexibility of the exchange rate and 
the health of the financial system in determining whether protracted current account 
balances are likely to result in external crises. 
In this thesis, we identified factors that influence peg duration using logit analy-
sis similar to Klein and Marion (1997). Klein and Marion (1997) used data in Latin 
American countries and focused on factors that affect the likelihood of devaluation in 
* 
Latin American countries. We focus on Asian countries. Our result is complementary 
to theirs in Latin American countries. Tornell (1997) also attempted to answer whether 
1 0 
there is a set of fundamentals that helps to explain the probability of crises. He inves-
tigated two specific events, 1994 Tequila and 1997 Asian financial crises to see whether 
the rule that explains the cross country variation in the severity of the Tequila crisis also 
applicable to the Asian financial crises. We investigate devaluation in Asian countries 
between 1960 to 1999 to see whether factors that affect the probability of devaluation in 
Latin American countries also applicable to Asian countries. Our focus in devaluation 
is complementary to Tornell's (1997) focus in crises. Although there are differences 
in data set and research methodology, our findings are consistent with Tornell (1997). 
Asian countries and Latin American countries share the same fundamentals that assist 
in explaining the probability of devaluation. 
In short, previous studies mainly focused on 1997 crises, sample periods were mainly 
between 1990 to 1997 and they usually adopted cross-country linear regression to ex-
plain the causes and effects of Asian financial crises among different Asian countries. 
Our analysis focuses on devaluation in Asian countries between 1960 and 1999. We 
use logit model to explain factors that affect the probability of devaluation in Asian 
countries as a whole. We do not attempt to determine factors that affect the cross 





3.1 Defining pegs 
Crucial to our analysis is the definition of exchange-rate peg. Between 1960 and 1999, 
most Latin American currencies were pegged to the US dollar. Exchange-rate pegs 
can be easily recognized by eye-balling the exchange rate variation. Klein and Marion 
(1997) set the condition that the fixed exchange rate must lasted for at least three 
months to constitute a spell. According to this condition, they got 92 spells between 
1956 to 1991. Six spells are dropped because of missing data on the real exchange rate, 
and 25 additional spells are dropped because of missing information on foreign asset 
holdings. They were thus left with a total of 61 peg spells. Information about these 61 
peg spells is provided in the appendix for reference. 
For Asian countries, the definition for an exchange-rate peg is much more compli-
cated since some of the exchange-rate pegs are pegged to a basket of currencies, of 
unknown composition, instead of to the U.S. dollar alone. We can roughly divide the 
exchange rate pattern in Asian currencies into two stage, before and after the 1970s. 
1 2 
Before 1970s, most Asian currencies were pegged to the US dollar with a periodical 
devaluation. We call this kind of exchange-rate peg fixed peg. For example, the Baht 
was fixed to the US dollar at 23 Baht per US dollar from August 1981 to October 1984. 
In a plot, the exchange rate will appear as a horizontal line in this period. For fixed 
peg, beginning and ending of peg are clear, just follow the period of its corresponding 
horizontal line. 
After 1970s, most Asian countries adopted basket pegged system. Their currencies 
were mainly pegged with the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the Marks, the currencies 
of their major trading partners. Government maintains the fluctuation of exchange rate 
to US dollar within a certain band. We call this kind of exchange-rate peg basket peg. 
For example, the Baht was pegged to a US dollar-dominated basket of currencies from 
January 1988 to June 1997. Because this basket peg does not show a horizontal line 
in a plot of the exchange rate against U.S. dollar, the beginning and ending of basket 
peg are difficult to determine from the plot. In this thesis, we follow government 
announcements and their exchange rate policies to determine the beginning and ending 
of basket pegs. Our data set include both fixed pegs arid basket pegs. In the following 
section, we discuss each exchange-rate peg in the data set separately. 
As a check of the sensitivity of our results to the choice of exchange-rate peg def-
inition. We repeat the same analysis, but use a different definition of exchange-rate 
pegs in Asian countries. A detail description of this definition, the results from this 
definition and the comparison among the results from these two different definitions 
are discussed in Chapter 8. 
I 
Below we list the 24 exchange-rate pegs� extracted according to government an-
1 There was a total 28 pegs between 1960 and 1999，four of them are dropped because of missing 
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nouncements and exchange rate policies. Data source in this section included Asia Year-
book by Far Eastern Economic Review (various issue form 1960-1999), Brahm(1993) 
and Rana(1982). 
3.1.1 China 
Figure 3.1: Exchange rate of China (RMB per US$) 
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Figure 3.1 plots the exchange rate of China between 1960 and 1999. Three devaluation 
pegs are extracted. 
1. July 1986 - November 1989 
, In July 1986, the RMB was devalued by an unprecedented 15.8% in an attempt 
to restrain what the authorities considered to be "unnecessary imports", and at 
data on international reserves 
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the same time to promote exports and foreign investment. It devalued from 3.2 
to 3.72 RMB per US dollar and pegged at this rate until the 1989 devaluation. 
2. December 1989 - October 1990 
On 15 December, 1989, the RMB was lowered by 26.8% against the US dollar, 
bringing the exchange rate from 3.72 to 4.72 RMB per US dollar. The move was 
aimed at strengthening China's export in the wake of the fall-off in China trade 
following the event of 4 June. 
3. November 1990 - December 1993 
In November 90, the RMB devalued from 4.72 to 5.22 RMB per US dollar. And 
during November 1990 - December 1993, the RMB has continued to devalue 
with occasional adjustment to narrow the gap between the official and informal 
markets (monthly change in exchange rate was within 1%). The ending of the 
dual exchange rate system on 1 January, 1994 drove the exchange rate to devalue 




Figure 3.2: Exchange rate of Indonesia (Rps per US$) 
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1. Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
Figure 3.2 plots the exchange rate of Indonesia between 1966 and 1999. Four devalua-
tion pegs are extracted. Because there is missing data on exchange rate before 1966 and 
on international reserves before 1970, the pegs before 1970 are ignored in our analysis. 
1. September 1971 - October 1978 
In August 1971, the Indonesian Rupiah lowered 9.78% from 378 to 415 riipiah 
per US dollar. In 16 November 1978, the currency was devalued by around 50% 
against the US dollar, to 625 rupiah per US dollar, with which its seven years old 
fixed link was also ended, changed to a "managed float" system. The object of 
this devaluation was to provide some relief to the non-oil traded goods industries 
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from the squeeze of high inflation rates resulting from the payments surpluses. 
2. March 1979 - March 1983 
Since the massive devaluation of the rupiah in November 1978, the Indonesian 
currency has been pegged to a basket of currencies. The Rupiah has no sub-
stantial change in the US dollar exchange rate. Though the rupiah continued to 
weaken against American currency, the monthly change in exchange rate was less 
than 1% until March 1983. President Suherto in his August 1982 Independence 
Day address stressed that a devaluation was unnecessary and that government 
would continue to manage-float the rupiah exchange rate. However, on March 30, 
1983. government devalued the rupiah by 27.6% form 702 to 968 rupiah per US 
dollar. This devaluation may be due to deteriorating balance-of-payments situa-
tion affected the country's official foreign reserves levels, which dropped from 4.2 
billion US dollars in December 1982 to 3.1 billion US dollars in March 1983. 
3. April 1983 - August 1986 
During April 1983 - August 1986, the rupiah underwent depreciation trend, how-
ever, the monthly change in exchange rate was within 1%. During this period, 
government statements said that there would be no devaluation. However, on 
12 September, 1986, the Indonesian rupiah was devalued by 31% against the US 
dollar from 1134 per to 1644 rupiah per US dollar. 
4. November 1986 - July 1997 
During this exchange-rate peg, Bank Indonesia, the central bank maintained a 
I 
measure of control over the exchange rate, which was set against a basket of 
currencies, of which the US dollar is most important. An "indication" rate was 
1 7 
set by Bank Indonesia each morning, and allowed the rupiah to fluctuate within 
the trading band. Although government was able to maintain the rate within 
trading band, the devaluation pressure was increasing during the peg. On two 
occasions in 1996, first in January and then in September, Bank Indonesia widened 
the trading band by which the rupiah trades against the US dollar, first from 3% 
to 5% , and then from 5% to 8%. In August 1997, it devaluated in the Asian 
financial crises from 2518 in July 1997 to 2800 rupiah per US dollar in August 
1997. The devaluation continued and the exchange rate was 4908 repiah per US 
dollar in December 1997 and 9662 in January 1998. 
3.1.3 Korea 
Figure 3.3: Exchange rate of Korea (Won per US$) 
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Figure 3.3 plots the exchange rate of Korea between 1960 and 1999. Three devaluation 
pegs are extracted. Because there is missing data in international reserves before 1968, 
the pegs before 1968 are ignored in our analysis. 
1. July 1971 - November 1974 
In June 1970, the won was devalued by 13.4% from 332 to 370 wons per US dollar. 
Prom July 1971 to December 1974, the rate was fixed at 370. From January 1972 
to August 1974, the monthly change in exchange rate was within 1%. Since early 
1973, the Korea Exchange Bank had managed to post the buying price of the 
won at slightly less than 400 wons per US dollar. From May 1974 to November 
1974, its exchange rate was fixed at 399 wons per US dollar. In December 1974, 
it devaluated from 399 to 484 wons per US dollar. This 20% reduction against 
the US dollar was aimed at off-set ting the severe inflation that South Korea had 
suffered. 
2. January 1975 - November 1979 
Since January 1975, the won has been fixed at 484 wons per US dollar. On 7 
December, 1979, South Korea devalued the won by 20% from 484 to 580 wons 
per US dollar. 
3. March 1990 - November 1997 
On 1 March, 90’ the South Korea authorities inaugurated a money market, which 
allows the won to float within a narrow band. During this peg, South Korea's 
, foreign-exchange market remained hampered by strict government regulations, 
designed to prevent speculative transactions. Nevertheless, the government took 
a cautious step towards liberalisation on 1 September, 1991 when it widened the 
1 9 
daily foreign exchange trading limit from 0.4% to 0.6% of the previous day's 
average rate, further widened to 1% in 1993. Due to the spread of Asian financial 
crises, the trading band failed to maintain the exchange rate in November 1997. 
Won devalued from 921 to 1484 wons per US dollar. 
3.1.4 Malaysia 
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Figure 3.4 plots the exchange rate of Malaysia between 1960 and 1999. Only one 
devaluation pegs is extracted. Before 1975, Malaysia underwent an revaluation trend, 
and had not experienced any great devaluation before the Asian financial crises. 
I 
1. June 1992 - August 1997 
Although the ofFcial Malaysian policy since September 1975 has been pegging to 
2 0 
an undisclosed basket of currencies, the actual policy seemed to be a continuation 
of managed floating which was adopted on 21 June, 1973. However, exchange 
rate fluctuated from 0.5% to 3% monthly until the ringgit's dramatic rise against 
the US dollar since the start of 1992 2.74 to 2.5 ringgit per US dollar. From June 
1992, with the help of aggressive central bank intervention, every time when the 
ringgit threatened to breach the 2.55 ringgit per US dollar, central band held the 
currency within a narrow band 2.50 to 2.60 ringgit per US dollar. In August 1997, 
due to the spread of Asian financial crises, the ringgit devalued from 2.50 to 3.0 
ringgit per US dollar and ended this peg. 
3.1.5 Philippines 
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1. Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
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Figure 3.5 plots the exchange rate of Philippines between 1960 and 1999. Seven deval-
uation pegs are extracted. 
1. May 1962 - January 1970 
During this period, the Philippines Peso was fixed pegged to US dollar at 3.9 
pesos to the US dollar. In February 1970, the peso dropped more than 40% in 
value to 6.4 peso per US dollar and was allowed to float. 
2. October 1970 - March 1972 
During this period, the Philippines Peso was fixed pegged to the US dollar at 
6.44 pesos (with less than 0.3% monthly adjustment in exchange rate). However, 
when US dollar was devalued in February 72, the peso had gone down with it. 
Devalued from 6.44 pesos per US dollar to 6.77. 
3. May 1972 - October 1974 
Government still underwent strictly controlled float, which had been operated 
by Central Bank since 1970, kept the rate at 6.78 pesos per US dollar, the rate 
established in May 1972. Monthly change in exchange rate was less than 0.2% 
until October 1974 where it devalued 40% from 6.77 to 7.07 pesos per US dollar. 
4. August 1975 - September 1983 
During this period, the Central Bank controlled the movement of exchange rate 
within a certain unspecified band. Monthly change in exchange rate was less than 
2% until 5 October, 1983, the peso devalued 24% from 11 to 13.7 pesos per US 
dollar. 
5. November 1983 - May 1984 
During this period, the Philippines pesos was fixed pegged to the US dollar at 14 
2 2 
pesos per US dollar. In June 1983, it devalued 24% to 18 pesos per US dollar. 
6. April 1986 - October 1990 
During this period, the Philippines pesos underwent managed-float with the US 
dollar. However, the monthly change in exchange rate was less than 1% during 
this period. On 25 October, 90, Central Bank devalued the Peso to a new rate 
28 pesos per US dollar from 25.7 in the previous month. 
7. November 1990 - August 1997 
During this period, government successfully used its reserves to avoid speculative 
attack. Monthly change in exchange rate maintained within 2%. For example, in 
October 1992, government purchased an estimated USl billion from the market 
to prevent the peso from appreciation, successfully stabilising it at 25.10-30 pesos 
per US dollar level. However, followed the trend of the Asian financial crises, the 
Peso devalued from 26.3 to 32.3 pesos per US dollar in July 1997. After the crises 
and up to now, the level of the Philippines peso exchange rate is determined on 
the basis of supply and demand, with the authorities using intervention whenever 
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Figure 3.6 plots the exchange rate of Singapore between 1960 and 1999. Only one 
devaluation peg is extracted. Its currency showed a revaluation trend before 1997 
Asian financial crises. 
1. July 1995 - September 1997 
The Singapore dollar did not experience a great depreciation before 1997 Asian 
financial crises. However, the monthly change in exchange rate was not within a 
narrow brand and shown an appreciation trend until July 1995. It steady managed 
fixed at 1.42 singaporian dollar per US dollar with less than 1% monthly change 
in exchange rate after July 1995. However, it devalued to 1.6 singaporian dollar 
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per US dollar in the Asian financial crises. 
3.1.7 Thailand 
Figure 3.7: Exchange rate of Thailand (Baht per US$) 
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1. Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
Figure 3.7 plots the exchange rate of Thailand between 1960 and 1999. Four devaluation 
pegs are extracted. 
1. January 1965 - January 1973 
Fixed exchange rate system was adopted, the Baht was fixed to the US dollar at 
20.8 Baht per US dollar. In February 1973, the baht was devalued by 10%. 
2. August 1973 - June 1981 
Prom August 1973 to March 1978, the Baht was pegged with the US dollar. But 
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from 8 March, 1978, Baht's value was determined against a basket of currencies 
weighted according to their importance in Thai trade and payments. However, 
no matter the change in exchange rate system. The monthly change in exchange 
rate was held within 1% until it devalued 8.7% in July 1981. 
3. August 1981 - October 1984 
During this period, baht-US dollar exchange rate remained fixed at 23 to the US 
dollar. On 5 November, 1984. The Baht was devalued by 15%, from 23 baht per 
US dollar to 27 Baht per US dollar. 
4. January 1988 - June 1997 
In 1988, the baht was managed to US dollar-dominated basket of currencies, the 
Baht's swing against the dollar was limited to less than 1% on either side of 
the 25.25 Baht per US dollar average exchange rate. Although there were some 
adjustment during the peg, it successfully held its 25.0-26.0 Baht range against 
the US dollar. In July 1997, it underwent a great devaluation from 25.5 to higher 
than 30 Baht to US dollar, even at a low of 47.25 at ending 1997. 
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3.1.8 Taiwan 
Figure 3.8: Exchange rate of Taiwan (NT$ per US$) 
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Figure 3.8 plots the exchange rate of Taiwan between 1960 and 1999. Only one deval-
uation peg is extracted. 
1. June 1990 - September 1997 
After four years of steady appreciation, on 10 May 1990, the NT dollar devalued 
4%, dropped from 26.44 to 27.50 New Taiwan dollar per US dollar. After this 
devaluation, the New Taiwan dollar was fluctuating in a narrow band between 26 
and 27.5. (monthly change in exchange rate was within 1.5%) In October 1997, 
\ 
it devalued from 28 to 31 New Taiwan dollar per US dollar. 
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3.2 Summary statistics for exchange rate pegs 
These 24 spells are summarized in Table 3.1. The average duration of peg is 60 months 
while the median duration is 57.5 months. The standard deviation of the duration is 
31 months. The range of the peg duration is 7 months to 126 months. Note that pegs 
in Asian countries last much longer than those in Latin American countries, which the 
average duration of a dollar peg is 32 months and the median duration is 10 months. 
In Latin American countries, the exit rate is high in the early months of a peg. Ten 
percent of the sixty-one spells in Klein and Marion's data set end in their fourth month; 
more than one-third of the pegs are over by the eighth month; and more than half end 
within one year. However, for Asian countries, the duration of peg distributed quite 
evenly between 10 to 90 months, so we cannot say in what duration we have the highest 
exit rate. 
Economic variables used to explain the peg duration are mainly from International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. The appendix describe the definition 
and calculation of these variables and their sources. 
Table 3.2 lists and summarizes the economic variables of Asian countries at the end 
of spells. We measure openness as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. 
Using this definition, average openness at the end of a peg is about 6% in our sample. 
Trade concentration is calculated as the share of total trade (exports plus imports) 
with the United States and Japan separately. On average, about 21% and 25% of total 
trade is conducted with the United States and Japan at the end of peg. Average net 
’ foreign asset to M2 ratio is 0.09 while average foreign reserves to M2 ratio is 0.69. 
Current account to GDP ratio have an average value -0.04. Thus, most countries exit 
2 8 
a peg when they have current account deficit at the end of peg. Inflation differential 
is calculated as the year to year change in CPI of Asian countries minus year to year 
change in CPI of the United States.^ On average, there are almost 6% higher inflation 
rate in Asian countries than the United States at the end of peg. 
The real bilateral exchange rate index with the United States (set at 100 at the 
beginning of each peg) appreciates an average of 0.64% per month during a peg, 0.58% 
for Japan, 0.61% for Germany. Compared with an average of 4% appreciation per 
month in Latin American countries, the monthly change in real bilateral exchange rate 
is smaller. This factor may explain why Asian countries have longer duration of pegs 
than Latin American countries. 
Table 3.1: Summary for 24 exchange rate pegs  
Number of pegs 24 
Mean duration in months (standard deviation) 60 (31) 
Median duration of months 57.5 
Number of pegs by country 
China 3 









^For example, we calculate the year to year change in CPI for July 1997 by comparing July 1997 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this paper, we adopt the same methodology used by Klein and Marion (1997), 
who investigated empirically the duration of exchange rate pegs in 16 Latin American 
countries, via a logit model. 
There are a number of important determinants for the duration of an exchange-rate 
peg. While some of these determinants may remain more or less constant over a peg, 
others will change. So, using the value of an explanatory variable at the beginning 
or at the end of a peg or using its change over the spell or its average value during 
the spell fails to capture important information about the time path of the variable 
during the spell. Klein and Marion (1997) use logit analysis which allows time-varying 
determinants.1 According to Klein and Marion (1997), logit model is a useful tool for 
estimating the monthly probability of leaving an exchange-rate peg, particularly for 
developing countries. 
, The logit methodology has been used often in the analysis of devaluation and cur-
iPor a discussion of logit models and its estimation, see Greene 'Econometric Analysis' Third edition, 
Chapter 19. 
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rency crises, in addition to Klein and Marion (1997). Pazarbasioglu and Otker (1997) 
estimated a logistic regression to determine the one-step-ahead probability of a crisis 
and devaluation in Mexico. Their estimation was based on monthly data in Mexico for 
the period October 1982 - December 1994. During this period the Mexican peso was 
devalued three times. They attempted to identify the role of Mexico's macroeconomic 
fundamentals in exerting pressure on the peso, and to evaluate whether the associated 
regime changes could be explained by a deterioration of these fundamentals. Similarly, 
in our paper we use monthly data in Asian countries for the period from January I960 
-December 1999. We also attempted to determine the one-step-ahead probability of a 
devaluation in Asian countries by logit model. 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1998) estimated a logit regression to determine the three, 
six and twelve months ahead probability of devaluation for 17 developed and nine 
developing countries between May 1984 - December 1997 in order to studies whether 
exchange rate expectations and overvaluations are predictors of currency crises. 
In our study, we follow Klein and Marion (1997) closely. We construct the data set 
such that each observation represents the value of variables during one month in one 
of the 24 pegs in the sample. Thus, the data set contains about 1400 (24x60) monthly 
observations. We use logit model to estimate the relation between the peg devaluation 
and economic factors. 
The dependent variable equals zero in any month when the peg is in effect and equals 
one in the month that the spell ends. Variables from month t are used to determine 
. the probability of exit in month t + 1. In this approach, the probability of maintaining 
the peg up until month t + 1, that is A + i = 0， a n d the probability of a devaluation in 
month t + 1, that is A + i = l, depend upon the vector of variables as follows: 
3 2 
Prob(Dt+i = 0\Xt) = 1/[1 + exp(jo + 7i 而)] (4.1) 
Prob[(Dt+i = l\Xt) = expi^o + 7i 义 t) /[l + exp{^o + JiXt)] (4.2) 
These equation in terms of the logarithms of odds ratio can be rewritten as follows: 
In[((Prob(Dt+i = l)/Prob{Dt+i = 0))|Xt)] = 7 0 + (4.3) 
The elements of the vector 71 represent the effect on the log-odds ratio of a change 
in the vector of variables Xt，i.e. if 71 < 0, a decrease in Xi implies an increase 
in probability of devaluation. If 71 > 0, an increase in Xi implies an increase in the 
probability of devaluation. 
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Chapter 5 
Determinants of peg duration 
There are a wide range of determinants that determine the duration of a exchange 
rate peg. Some determinants of peg duration should reflect the trade-offs associated 
with the benefits and costs of ending a peg. A benefit of ending a peg is due to the 
adjustment in the real exchange rate following an adjustment in nominal exchange 
rate. This adjustment in real exchange rate help alleviates the problem associated with 
persistent inflation differentials between the two countries that have the fixed nominal 
exchange rate. The costs of ending a peg include a sudden change in relative prices and 
loss of confidence in the devalued currency. A sudden change in relative prices has an 
impact on current account balance. A loss of confidence in the devalued currency may 
lead to another devaluation pressure. 
Some determinants should reflect the signal of devaluation. According to Tornell 
(1999), since the short positions involved in a currency attack entail significant costs, 
丨 an individual money manager will attack a country only if she expects other money 
managers to also attack the country, and anticipates that the country will respond with 
a sizeable depreciation or devaluation. The eruption of a crisis in a certain country 
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indicates to each investor that other investors will attack vulnerable countries in the 
near future. Although investors do not communicate among themselves, they do not 
attack countries randomly. They instead use a common set of fundamentals and a 
stable filtering rule to predict which countries are more likely to respond with sizable 
depreciation and then concentrate their attacks on those countries. Here, we focus on 
identifying those variables which affect costs and benefits of ending a peg and hence act 
as indicators for devaluation. According to this view, our result can be interpreted as 
how these variables affect the costs and benefit of releasing the peg and "the common 
set of fundamentals rule" that investors look at. 
5.1 Real Exchange Rate 
We expect an appreciation in real exchange rate increases the likelihood of ending the 
peg due to the following process. The overvaluation of real exchange rate may be 
a result of inflation trends. The domestic prices and wages may increase while the 
nominal exchange rate has been fixed. This, in turn, will lead to a decline of export 
competitiveness, as domestic costs rise at a faster pace than the proceeds from exports. 
A large current account deficits result. Consequently, domestic interest rates will have to 
rise in order to attract the foreign capital required to finance this deficit. Higher interest 
rates, in turn, will hurt local companies, and will increase the ratio of non-performing 
bank loans. The banks, and sometimes the government, will react to this picture by 
rolling over questionable loans, hiding their true financial situation, and by issuing 
‘ more dollar denominated debt. As additional foreign funds pour in, the inflation trend 
becomes more severe, and the vicious circle is reinforced. There are many examples, 
either in Latin America or in Asia, that countries experience a real appreciation against 
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the currencies to which they pegged over the course of their pegs. According to the 
analysis of the Mexican crisis and its sequel during 1995, Sachs, et.al. (1996) emphasized 
the role of real exchange rate overvaluation: according to their computation, during the 
1990-94 period the Mexican peso was overvalued, on average, by almost 29 percent. In 
this thesis, we measure the real exchange rate of a given country against the US dollar, 
the Mark and the Yen separately because Asian currencies are mainly pegged with 
these three currencies. The bilateral real exchange rate index is calculated using the 
end-of-month bilateral nominal U.S. dollar, Mark, Yen exchange rate and the consumer 
price indices in the domestic country, the U.S., Germany and Japan. The index is set 
equal to 100 at the start of each peg. The exchange rate index is measured such that 
a decrease implies an appreciation. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on the real 
exchange rate index to be negative so that an appreciation increase the likelihood of 
ending the peg. 
5.2 Openness 
The degree of openness, is measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports 
to the total output of the economy. The degree of openness influences the impact of 
exchange rate changes on the general price level. Given the same change in exchange 
rate, a more open economy will experiences a greater impact on its price level. When 
there is devaluation, the political cost will be much greater for a more open economy. 
Thus, the government of a more open economy will more likely resist devaluation. On 
_ the other hand, greater openness may increase the cost of maintaining a given exchange 
rate and hence increase the likelihood of devaluation. In short, the sign on this variable 
is ambiguous. 
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5.3 Trade concentration 
The degree of country's geographical trade concentration is measured by the share of 
its trade going to the countries which it pegged with. The degree of trade concentration 
may explain the exit of peg through its impact on adjustment costs. A devaluation may 
have a large impact on the general price level for an economy with a less diversified trade 
pattern. If the price impact affects the political cost of devaluation, then a higher degree 
of trade concentration would decrease the likelihood of devaluation. However, a higher 
degree of trade concentration may increase the cost of maintaining a given exchange rate 
and thus be associated with an increase in the likelihood of devaluation. We measure 
the degree of country's geographical trade concentration of a given country with respect 
to the United States and Japan separately. Thus, we do not have an expectation on 
the sign of this variable. 
5.4 Foreign reserves to M2 ratio 
A decrease in foreign reserves to M2 ratio is associated with a high probability of 
devaluation. The relative magnitude of deposits to international reserves implies that 
the latter would not have been sufficient to honor the outstanding stock of deposits at 
the fixed exchange rate. Given this condition, a run by domestic depositors was bounded 
to result in either the bankruptcy of the financial system or the forced abandonment of 
the fixed exchange rate system. We would expect a negative sign so that a decrease in 
this ratio increases the probability of ending the peg. 
» 
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5.5 Net foreign asset to M2 ratio 
Foreign asset holding reflects the ability of a government to maintain a peg, and thus 
influence the monthly probability of devaluation. We choose a broad measure of inter-
national liquidity, namely the ratio of net foreign asset of the monetary sector to the 
quantity of money. We expect a negative coefficient on the net foreign asset variable 
since a decline in net foreign asset holding should increase the probability of leaving a 
peg. 
5.6 Current account deficit 
Most current account deficits are financed by the sale of domestic securities to for-
eigners. This means that the current account position a country can maintain over the 
medium run will be determined by the pace at which foreigners want to accumulate that 
country's financial liabilities (bond, CDs, bank debt, equity and so on). If foreigners 
lose confidence in the country, they will rapidly reallocate their portfolio, generating 
massive capital outflows. The massive capital outflows will force the currency to go 
through devaluation. We measure current account deficit as a percentage of GDP of 
a given country and expect the coefficient would have negative sign means that large 
current account deficit increases the probability of ending a peg. 
5.7 Inflation differential 
Inflation tends to have a considerable degree of inertia in Asian countries during the 
pegged period. Inflation is the main cause of real exchange rate appreciation, and thus 
induces devaluation pressure on domestic currencies. We measure inflation differential 
3 8 
by subtracting inflation rate of a given country from inflation rate of United States. 
We expect the coefficient would have positive sign, i.e. an increase in the inflation gap 
will increases the probability of ending a peg. 
5.8 Number of months on the peg 
The number of months on the peg and its square are also included as regressors to 
control for trend movements not already capture in other variables. 
5.9 Expected effect of variables 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this chapter, we report the logit regression results obtained from the 24 exchange 
rate pegs that described in Section 3. 
Table 6.1 reports the results obtained from the basic logit regressions with a single 
variable. The results in this table indicate a significant link between the three real 
bilateral exchange rate index, net foreign asset to M2 ratio, foreign reserves to M2 
ratio, change in this ratio and the likelihood of a devaluation. Although the other 
variables do not show a significant t-statistic, the sign of the coefficients are consistent 
to our expectation. 
Table 6.2 reports results obtained from basic logit regression with all variables.i 
This table includes two specifications. These two specifications differ in their inclusion 
of dummy variables. Specification A does not include any country dummy variables 
while specification B does. The results in this table indicate a significant link between 
the real exchange rate to U.S. dollar and the likelihood of a devaluation. A decrease in 
openness lowers the probability of a peg ending, although the coefficient on openness is 
iReal exchange rates with respect to Japan and Germany are not included since they show a high 
correlation with real exchange rate with respect to US. Inflation differential also shows a high correlation 
with the three real exchange rates. 
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Table 6.1: Estimates with one variable in each regression only 
Variables Coefficient Standard error T-statistics 
In(R.E.R)us -1.244** 0 5 ^ 2^78 
In{R.E.R) Japan -1.091** 0.529 2.062 
In(R.E.R)Gerrnany -1.299** 0.479 2.711 
Openness -1.303 3.166 0.411 
Trade Concus -0.202 1.979 0.102 
Trade Concjapan -1.839 2.077 0.885 
N.F.A/M2 -0.325** 0.166 1.958 
Foreign reserves/M2 -0.489 0.362 1.351 
Current account/GDP -1.691 2.321 0.729 
Inflation differential 0.036 0.025 . 1.44 
In{Foreign reserves/M2) -1.346** 0.521 2.583 
d{In{Foreign reserves/M2)) -0.163 0.11 1.482 
Number of observations 1444 
Number of pegs 24 
Notes: 
1. *=significant at 10% level. 
2. **=significant at 5% level. 
significant only when the country dummy variables are also included in the regression. 
An increases in trade concentration lowers the probability of a peg devaluation. The 
sign of trade concentration with Japan did not change when country dummies was 
included but the sign of trade concentration with U.S. changes from negative to positive 
when country dummies was included. Foreign reserves to M2 ratio, have a significant 
negative coefficient in both specification A and B. A decrease in foreign reserves to M2 
ratio increases the likelihood of devaluation significantly.^ For current account to GDP 
ratio, the negative coefficient indicates an increase in current account deficit increases 
the likelihood of devaluation in the next month. However the coefficient on current 
, account ratio is not significant when the country dummy variables are also included in 
specification B. In Latin American sample, the time on the peg matters. The likelihood 
2Net foreign asset to M2 ratio is not included since it shows a high correlation with foreign reserves 
to M2 ratio. ^ 
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Table 6.2: Estimates with all identified variables and country dummies 
Variables Specification A Specification B 
without country dummies with country dummies 
In{R.E.R)us -1.0126* (0.575) -0.9532 (0.918) 
Openness 5.6707 (4.480) 59.9835** (26.792) 
Trade Concus -3.1708 (2.684) 1.8275 (4.453) 
Trade Concjapan -2.3279 (3.019) -4.3605 (3.733) 
Foreign reserves/M2 -1.6315** (0.511) -3.2838** (0.807) 
Current account/GDP -5.2060* (3.678) -2.7694 (4.727) 
Time on peg 0.0037 (0.027) 0.0064 (0.032) 
Time on peg'^ 0.0002 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000) 
Country dummy 
China - 14.6441** (7.102) 
Indonesia - 15.5381** (6.909) 
Korea - 14.0077** (6.645) 
Malaysia - 10.3337** (4.546) 
Philippines - 13.8715** (6.890) 
Singapore - 10.7245** (3.731) 
Thailand - 15.1559** (7.186) 
Log likelihood -105.7229 -99.8683 
Estrella R-squared 0.0241 0.0335 
Number of observations 1444 1444 
Number of pegs 24 24 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Specification A does not include any country variables while specification B does. 
3. Estrella R-squared is calculated according to Estrella (1998). 
4. *=significant at 10% level. 
5. **=significant at 5% level. 
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of a devaluation decreases with the time on the peg. However, the time on the peg 
does not matter in Asian countries. In the table, we also report a goodness of fit 
measure, suggested by Estrell (1998). As shown, the data does not fit the model very 
well, slightly worse than those in Klein and Marion (1997). The inclusion of countries 
dummies does improve the goodness of fit marginally, indicating that country specific 
factors are important.3 
Compare with Latin American countries, most determinants that affect the proba-
bility of devaluation in Latin American countries also affect exchange rate peg existence 
in Asian countries. However, a few determinants that significantly affect the likelihood 
of devaluation in Latin American countries have poor explanatory power in Asian coun-
tries, such as the time on the peg. 
We examine whether the change in international liquidity (i.e. foreign reserves to 
M2 ratio) is a significant determinant in Table 6.3. From the view of speculative attack 
on the currency, we would expect to find a fall in reserves over previous month to be 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of a peg exit. In specification C of Table 
6.3, we use the logarithm of foreign reserves to M2 ratio instead of foreign reserves to 
M2 ratio as a measure of international liquidity level, while in specification D, we also 
included the change in this ratio. In Specification E, we included the country dummies 
as well. The logarithm of foreign reserves to M2 ratio is significant at 5% level and 
with the expected negative sign, consistent with results from Latin American sample. 
The change in this variable is an independent factor in determining the likelihood of 
devaluation in Asian countries although it is not significant in Latin American sample. 
^Since Klein and Marion do not use Estrell's measure, strictly speaking, our goodness of fit measures 
are not directly comparable to theirs. 
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We find that a sudden decrease in foreign reserves to M2 ratio relative to the previous 
month increases the probability of devaluation in Asian countries. The signs of other 
variables are broadly similar to that of the corresponding specification A in Table 6.2. 
The signs of coefficients in Specification D are not affected by the inclusion of country 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.4: Estimates with time on peg subsample and time on peg dummy variables 
Variables Specification F Specification G S p e c i f i c a t i o n H 
Full Sample 1st 24 months 1st 36 months 
In{R.E.R)us -1.1170* (0.685) 0.7321 (6.746) -0.8506 (0.977) 
Openness 5.4357 (4.508) -73.1663 (116.956) -38.7982 (50.946) 
Trade Concus -3.0609 (2.672) 2.5056 (5.135) 3.8916 (3.685) 
Trade Concj—n -2.4252 (3.034) -2.6521 (6.215) -5.4369 (6.100) 
Foreign reserves/M2 -1.6830** (0.539) -1.6489 (3.481) 0.7917 (1.813) 
Current account/GDP -5.5810* (3.478) 6.0562 (14.206) 3.3553 (9.433) 
Time on peg -0.0433 (0.062) 0.5715 (0.578) -0.0818 (0.174) 
Time on peg: 0.0005 (0.000) -0.0216 (0.022) 0.0032 (0.000) 
Months 1 - 12 -1.4780 (2.055) ' 
Months 13 - 24 -1.7484 (1.619) 
Months 25 - 36 -0.9361 (1.074) 
Log likelihood -105.0307 -15.2150 -30.6870 
Estrella R-squared 0.0252 0.0136 0.0123 
Number of observations 1444 540 785 
Number of pegs 24 24 24 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Specification F consists 3 dummies for month 1-12, month 13-24 and month 25-36. 
3. Specification G consists data from the first 24 months of each spell only. 
4. Specification H consists data from the first 36 months of each spell only. 
5. Estrella R-squared is calculated according to Estrella (1998). 
6. *=significant at 10% level. 
7. **—significant at 5% level. 
Klein and Marion consider dummies for month 4-6, month 7-9 and month 10-12. The 
coefficients on these dummy variables can be roughly interpreted as the difference in the 
likelihood of devaluation between spells in these periods and otherwise equivalent spells 
that have lasted at least 12 months. They found that the likelihood of a devaluation is 
, higher for pegs in their first year than for pegs that have lasted at least 12 months. Since 
the average duration of pegs in Asian countries are much longer, we consider dummies 
for month 1-12, months 13-24 and months 25-36. Specification F in Table 6.4 reports 
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the result. The negative coefficients on the monthly dummy variables suggest that 
devaluation do not occur frequently in the first three years, although the coefficients are 
not significant. Other variables that significantly affect the probability of devaluation in 
the previous regression also show expected sign and significant t-statistics after monthly 
dummy variables are included. 
Specification G and H in Table 6.4 address the issue of the effects of time on the 
spell in a different manner. The sample in specification G use data from the first 24 
months of each spell only while specification H includes data from the first 36 months. 
Klein and Marion (1997) use data from the first six months and first year of the spell. 
We investigate pegs with longer duration because the average duration of pegs in Asian 
countries is much longer.4 
Data set in specification G is constructed according to the following rule. If the peg 
duration is less than 24 months, the whole peg is extracted to the data set. If the peg 
duration is longer than 24 months, only the first 24 observations in this peg is extracted 
to the data set. Similarly, data set in Specification H included the first 36 observations 
in each peg. We compare these results with its counterpart, Specification A in Table 
6.2, to see if the determinants differ in the first two years or first three years of a spell. 
Unlike the full sample, the restricted results in specification G and H in Table 6.4 
do not exhibit a significant effect on the determinants that use in specification A in 
Table 6.2. These results suggest that the determinants of peg duration that we have 
identified are not useful during the first two years or first three years of a peg. Different 
� from Klein and Marion (1997), the understanding of peg duration cannot be enhanced 
4 Result for data that included the first 12 months of each spell was not reported since most of the 
coefficients were close to zero. This may be due to limited sample size since there are only two exchange 
rate pegs that with duration less than 12 months. 
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by examining the early stages of a peg for Asian countries. Note that once we restrict 
our attention to peg duration of less than 24 months or 36 months, some variables such 
as real exchange rate to US, foreign reserve to M2 ratio and current account to GDP 
ratio showed unexpected sign. This evidence reinforces the view that an investigation 
of only the early stages of Asian exchange rate pegs does not help in explaining the 
peg duration. Comparing Specification G with Specification H, some variables such as 
real exchange rate to US and foreign reserves to M2 ratio showed opposite sign. This 
evidence also indicates that probability of devaluation does not have stable relationship 
to economic variables at the early stages of Asian exchange-rate pegs. 
As discussed before, there are fixed peg and basket peg in Asian countries. In 
addition to real exchange rate to U.S., we also consider real exchange rate to Japan 
and Germany as well. In Table 6.5, we investigate the robustness of our result when 
measured the real exchange rate index against United States (Specification I), Japan 
(Specification J) and Germany (Specification K) separately. Results are similar among 
these three specifications. This may be due to that most Asian countries pegged their 
currencies to a basket of currencies (U.S. dollar, Yen and Mark have a great proportion), 
so that real exchange rate index with United States, Japan and Germany provided 
similar results in explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs in Asian countries. The 
correlation between these three real exchange rate index is extremely high, and this 
explains why the results do not differ across the three real exchange rate indexes.^ 
Table 6.5 shows that real exchange rate to US has a much more significant impact on 
‘ the probability of devaluation in Asian countries than real exchange rate to Japan and 
5 Result that including these three real exchange rates in the same regression is not an ideal estimation 
since the correlation between these three variables is high. 
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Table 6.5: Estimates with different real exchange rate index 
Variables Specification I Specification J Specification K 
In{R.E.R)us In{R.E.R)japan I njR.E.R) Germany 
In{R.E.R)us -1.0126* (0.575) 
In{R.E.R)Japan -0.7977 (0.598) 
In(R.E.R)Germany -1.0571 (0.752) 
Openness 5.6707 (4.481) 5.2587 (4.477) 5.7860 (4.500) 
Trade Concus -3.1708 (2.684) -3.3125 (2.689) -3.2647 (2.691) 
Trade Concjapan -2.3279 (3.018) -2.4232 (3.053) -1.9969 (3.049) 
Foreign reserves/M2 -1.6315** (0.511) -1.6873** (0.514) -1.5899** (0.512) 
Current account/GDP -5.9206* (3.688) -5.7037* (3.579) -5.8287* (3.393) 
Time on peg -0.0037 (0.027) -0.0046 (0.027) -0.0041 (0.027) 
Time on peg'^ 0.0003 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000) 
Log likelihood -105.7229 -106.2358 -105.5956 
Estrella R-squared 0.0241 0.0233 0.0243 
Number of observations 1444 1444 1444 
Number of pegs 24 24 24 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Specification I, J and K included real exchange rate to US, Japan and Germany 
respectively. 
3. Estrella R-squared is calculated according to Estrella (1998). 
4. *二significant at 10% level. 
5. **=significant at 5% level. 
Germany. This may be explained by the exchange rate policies in Asian countries and 
the importance of the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the Mark to Asian currencies. 
For fixed peg, Asian currencies was pegged to the US dollar only and real exchange 
rates with Japan and Germany may not have explanatory power since the peg was not 
related to Yen and Mark. For basket peg, we need to understand the relation between 
the proportion share of an currency in the basket peg and its relative influence on the 
duration of the peg. 
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Chapter 7 
Predicted probabilities of 
devaluation 
The estimates presented above show the contribution of a variety of factors to the 
likelihood of devaluation. We find a very different characteristic of exchange rate peg 
in Latin American countries and Asian countries. Determinants of peg duration are 
important even during the first year of a peg in Latin American countries, while de-
terminants of peg duration do not shows its importance during the first three years 
of a peg in Asian countries. In this section, we would like to investigate whether the 
estimates of the probability of devaluation before actual devaluation in Asian countries 
shows a pattern similar to Latin American countries. 
The estimated probabilities of devaluation for the full sample are summarized in 
Table 7.1. The probability of devaluation is calculated using the logistic estimates of 
‘ Specification A presented in Table 6.2.1 The average estimated probability of devalu-
iWe also used the other specifications to calculate the probability of devaluation. The result are not 
reported since all of them show similar trend. 
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ation over the entire length of a spell is 0.016 and the median is 0.006. As the time 
of the actual devaluation draws closer, these estimated probabilities rise. At 6 months 
before the devaluation, the average estimated probabilities is 0.041. The average rises 
to 0.074 two months before the actual devaluation, and rises further to 0.108 in the 
month prior to the actual devaluation. The median values also show a steady increase 
as the devaluation draws near, rising from 0.025 six months prior to the actual devalu-
ation to 0.050 in the month before actual devaluation. These numbers are comparable 
to Latin American sample.^ We might also expect to find an increasing likelihood of 
a devaluation over time, especially in the period just before the actual devaluation. 
In more than 90% of the spells, the estimated probability of a devaluation rise in the 
month before the devaluation as compared to the month prior to that. We can also 
compare the probability of devaluation six month before the actual devaluation with 
the month before devaluation: more than 95% of the spells shows a higher probability 
of devaluation in the month before an actual devaluation. This pattern is similar to 
the trend that calculated from sample in Latin American countries. We also find that 
average percentage change in monthly probability show a peak at three month before 
actual devaluation in both Asian and Latin sample. One possible explanation is that 
most of the adverse effects such as massive loss of reserves, great appreciation in real 
exchange rate tend to turn more serious in three month prior to actual devaluation. In 
short, sudden increase in the probability of devaluation is an important indicator that 
the economy has a danger of devaluation. 
, Comparing the probability of devaluation in Latin American and Asian sample, 
Latin American sample showed a much higher mean and medium in the probability of 
2prob?ibility of devaluation for Latin sample are reported in the appendix 
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Table 7.1: Estimated probabilities of devaluation by number of months before actual 
devaluation  
Probabilities Months before actual devaluation 
Full Sample" 6 I 5 I 4 I 3 I 2 | 1 
Mean O l 6 O M 0j042 0.047 0.067 CLm 0.108 
St.Dev 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.050 0.090 0.106 0.145 
Av'g % Ch. 19.56% 10.40% 16.50% 36.85% 63.84% 12.85% 50.11% 
Median 0.006 0.025 0.018 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.050 
devaluation. A possible explanation is that the variation of the variables is much smaller 
in Asian countries, so the effectiveness of these variables in predicting devaluation is 
much smaller. Resulting a smaller mean and medium in the probability of devaluation. 
Indeed, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) measured volatility by calculating the mean 
absolute deviation for economic indicator in the 18 months prior to the crisis for both 
Latin America and East Asia. They compared among East Asia and Latin America 




Results from an alternative 
exchange rate peg definition 
In order to test for the robustness of the result with respect to different definitions of 
exchange-rate peg, we use an alternative definition to extract exchange-rate peg and 
compare results obtained according to this definition with the main results in Chapter 
6. 
According to this definition, monthly change in exchange rate must be bounded 
within a specific percentage (0.1%, 0.5% and 1%) for at least three months to constitute 
a spell. We do so because most Asian currencies peg to a basket of currencies and may 
allow its exchange rate against US dollar to fluctuate within a narrow band. The choice 
of percentage band is rather arbitrary since each country have its own exchange rate 
band target and this target may adjust from time to time. 
For exposition purpose, we take Thailand with a 1% band as an example. Figure 
8.1 plots the monthly percentage change in Thailand exchange rate. The two horizontal 
line represent the 1% band. Here we describe how the exchange rate peg was extracted. 
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Figure 8.1: Monthly change in Thailand exchange rate 
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notes: 
1. Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
Thailand established Exchange Equalisation Fund (EEF) in July 1955 to buy and sell 
foreign exchange in the market in order to stabilize its exchange rate. Central Bank 
switched from the peg of Baht with US dollar to a peg with a basket of its major trading 
partner's currencies in March 1978 and allowed commercial banks to participate in the 
process of determining exchange rates on a daily basis - call the "daily fixing”, which 
began in November 1978. There were changes in exchange rate from August 1978 to 
July 1973, all within 1 percent, and this is the first peg. Next peg began in July 1981 
when the Baht devalued by 8.7% from 21 to 23 Baht per US dollar, replaced the "daily 
fixing，，system with a system that entitled EEF to independently fix the rate at 23 
Baht per US dollar. This rate was maintained until October 1984 where EEF set an 
initial mid-rate 27 Baht per US dollar in 5 November 1984 and turned this peg to the 
5 5 
end. The next peg began in January 1988, the Baht's swing against the dollar was 
limited to less than 1% on either side of the Baht 25.25 per US dollar from that day 
and ended as a result of Asian financial crises in July 1997. From the above example, 
if 1% band was adopted, 3 devaluation pegs in Thailand are extracted since 1960. 
Pegs in other countries and according to different percentage bands are extracted using 
similar procedure. Detailed information about devaluation pegs extracted according to 
different percentage bands is summarized in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.2 reports the results from the above three data set with single variable. 
Foreign reserves to M2 ratio shows unexpected positive signs which are not significant. 
Real exchange rate to US dollar, trade concentration with U.S., net foreign asset to 
M2 ratio and current account to GDP ratio are not significant and the signs are not 
stable across different percentage bands. Openness shows significant positive coefficients 
while trade concentration with Japan shows significant negative coefficients in the three 
different percentage bands. 
Table 8.3 reports results obtained from basic logit regression with all identified 
variables. For 1% band, all the variables show expected sign but only openness and 
trade concentration with Japan is significant. For 0.5% band, both foreign reserves to 
M2 ratio and current account to GDP ratio show unexpected positive signs and only 
trade concentration with Japan is significant. For 0.1% band, foreign reserves to M2 
ratio shows unexpected positive sign and only trade concentraion with U.S. and Japan 
are significant. 
‘ Table 8.3 shows that the results are sensitive to the choice of percentage band in 
the definition of peg. Since each country have its own characteristic in macroeconomic 
fundamentals and exchange rate policies, using the same percentage band definition of 
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Table 8.1: Summary statistics for exchange rate pegs with 0.1%, 0.5% and 1% band 
— 0.1% 0.5% 1% 
Number of pegs ^ 73 TO 
Mean duration in months 19(24) 14.6(20) 19.3(22) 
Median duration of months 7 6 8.5 
Mean value for openness 8.99(10.68) 7.99(8.68) 9.69(9.68) 
Mean value for trade concentration with U.S 22(12) 20(10) 20(10) 
Mean value for net foreign asset to M2 ratio 0.34(1.61) 0.29(1.20) 0.37(1.17) 
Mean value for foreign reserves to M2 ratio 0.87(0.85) 0.88(0.74) 0.88(0.82) 
Mean value for current account to GDP ratio 0.04(0.13) 0.02(0.09) 0.05(0.10) 
Number of pegs by country 
China 4 7 5 
Hong Kong 3 0 0 
Indonesia 2 12 8 
Korea 4 12 15 
Malaysia 1 7 12 
Philippines 10 17 15 
Sgapore 2 6 4 
Thailand 3 7 3 
Taiwan 1 5 8 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a peg for nine Asian countries would not be the most appropriate approach. Comparing 
the results obtained according to this definition with the main results in Chapter 6, the 
main results shows a higher significance and all variables match up with expected sign. 
Our results support that in order to investigate Asian exchange-rate peg, we should 
analyse each country separately according to their own government announcements 
and exchange rate policies rather than using the same percentage band definition in all 
countries. 
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Table 8.2: Estimates with one variable in each regression only 
"Variables 0.1% 0.5% 1% 
In{R.E.R)us -0.086 (0.657) 0.3724 (0.739) -0.2476 (0.756) 
Openness 0.4875** (0.194) 0.5487** (0.158) 0.4999** (0.128) 
Trade Concus 1.9312 (1.582) -0.8238 (1.081) -0.7459(1.099) 
Trade Concjapan -4.1919** (1.669) -5.9279** (1.413) -0.0631** (0.023) 
N.F.A/M2 -0.1744 (0.176) -0.0742 (0.126) 0.0707 (0.124) 
Foreign reserves/M2 0.4273 (0.258) 0.5436 (0.267) 0.2904 (0.147) 
Current account/GDP -1.8620 (2.494) -0.5339 (1.527) 0.5607 (1.209) 
Number of observations ^ 1073 1284 
Number of pegs 30 73 70 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2. *=significant at 10% level 
3. **二significant at 5% level. 
Table 8.3: Estimates with all identified variable 
"Variables 0.1% 0.5% 1% 
In(R.E.R)us -0.8744 (0.637) -0.1178 (0.617) -0.8578 (0.585) 
Openness 0.8863 (0.394) 0.2298 (0.241) 0.5138** (0.208) 
Trade Concus 5.9733** (2.172) 0.3442 (1.268) -0.2549 (1.369) 
Trade Concjapan -4.5134* (2.441) -4.8317** (1.531) -0.0549** (0.025) 
Foreign reserves/M2 0.6002 (0.542) 0.2174 (0.271) -0.1898 (0.244) 
Current account/GDP -0.5175 (2.497) 1.0365 (1.676) -1.9286 (1.500) 
Time on peg -0.0482 (0.027) -0.0224 (0.036) -0.0249 (0.019) 
Time on peg: 0.0006 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.000) 0.Q002 (0.000) 
Log likelihood -109.0137 -252.0139 -260.9162 
Estrella R-squared 0.0329 0.0277 0.0170 
Number of observations 587 1073 1284 
Number of pegs 30 73 70 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
, 2. Estrella R-squared is calculated according to Estrella (1998). 
3. *=significant at 10% level. 




Several general conclusion can be made from the above results. First, what is the 
major distinction between exchange-rate peg in Asian countries and those in Latin 
American countries? Most Asian currencies are pegged to a basket of currencies, such 
as the US dollar, the Yen and the Mark while Latin American currencies are fixed 
pegged with US dollar. There are small fluctuations in the Asian currencies exchange 
rate with US dollar during the exchange-rate peg period. This made the definition 
of exchange-rate peg in Asia much more difficult and complicated. However, we tried 
to define exchange-rate peg in Asian countries according to two different definitions, 
one according to government announcements and exchange rate policies in each Asian 
country separately. The other according to the same percentage band definition to all 
countries. Our findings support that defining Asian exchange-rate peg according to 
their own government announcements and exchange rate policies is a more appropriate 
, approach to undergo Asian devaluation analysis. Our work also highlights the fact that 
more attention needs to be given to the definition of exchange rate peg since the results 
are sensitive to different definitions of peg. 
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In addition, we find that most of the determinants that influence exchange-rate pegs 
duration in Latin American countries also affect the monthly probability of leaving a 
peg in the sample of Asian pegs over 1960-1999 period. They are openness, trade con-
centration, international liquidity, and most significant, the real exchange rate. In both 
sample, appreciation of real exchange rate to US and the decrease in international liq-
uidity increase the monthly probability of devaluation. We find that increase in current 
account deficit and inflation differential to U.S. economy also increase the likelihood of 
devaluation. We also find that although appreciation of real exchange rate to Japan 
and Germany also increase the monthly probability of existing a peg, they are less 
significant than real exchange rate to U.S. 
The significant negative sign of real exchange rate has important policy implication 
to government who wants to maintain a stable exchange rate. For these governments, 
it will be useful to monitor the movement of real exchange rate closely and avoid 
prolonged period of appreciation in real exchange rate. In this regard, prudent monetary 
policy is important. The monetary policy may be used to target the inflation rate 
differentials and hence the real exchange rate. Avoiding a prolonged period of inflation 
rate differential help reduce the need to adjust the nominal exchange rate peg. 
Our work also highlights the facts that, different from the results form Latin Amer-
ican sample, those factors that we have identified before may not be influential factors 
in the early months of peg. This may be due to the exit rate is high in the early months 
of Latin American pegs while for Asian pegs, duration are nearly evenly distributed 
� from about 10 months to 90 months. Examining the early stages of a peg in Asian 
countries may not enhance the understanding of peg duration. 
Finally, the estimated monthly probability of devaluation calculated from the result 
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of logit regression shows a similar pattern as compare to Latin American sample (i.e. 
increasing likelihood of a devaluation over time, especially in the period just before 
actual devaluation occurs), this reinforces the usefulness of logit model for estimating 
the monthly probability of leaving an exchange-rate peg. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix contains three sections: the first section describes the source and calcu-
lation of variables, the second section reports the estimates included real exchange rate 
to Japan and Germany and inflation differential and the third section provides results 
from Klein and Marion (1997) for comparison and reference. 
A. l Data Description 
1. Real Exchange Rate Index 
Nominal exchange rate and CPI data were obtained from the IFS CD-ROM (line rf 
and 64’ repectively). The bilateral real exchange rates was calculated with respect 
to U.S., Japan and Germany separately. For example, bilateral real exchange rate 
of Thailand to US dollar (R.E.R.us) is calculated by the following formula. 
R.E.R.us 二 Nominal exchange rate(Baht/USdollar) x (CPI in US/CPI in Thailand) 
( A . l ) 
The value ofR.E.R. in the first month of peg is set at 100, and the relative index in 
the following months of peg is calculated. The real exchange rate index can reflect 
percentage change in real exchange rate index the month form the beginning of 
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a peg. A decrease in this index implies a real appreciation in the Thai Baht. 
2. Openness 
I calculate openness by dividing the sum of total export (IFS CD-ROM line 70) 
and total import (IFS CD-ROM line 71) by its gross domestic product (IFS CD-
ROM line 99B). 
openness = {Total export + Total import)/GDP (A.2) 
3. Trade concentration 
I calculate trade concentration by dividing the sum of export to and import from 
country that the Asian countries is pegged to by its total exports (IFS CD-ROM 
line 70) and imports (IFS CD-ROM line 71). Export to and import from certain 
country is obtained from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. This ratio 
calculates the trade share of Asian countries to its major trading partners -United 
States and Japan separately. For example, trade concentration with respect to 
United States (Trade concjjs) is calculated by the following formula. 
Trade Concus = (Export to US + Import from US)/(Total export + Total import) 
(A.3) 
(We have not included trade concentration with Germany since trade statistics 
with Germany are not provided in the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics.) 
4. International Liquidity 
I use two measures to calculate international liquidity. One included net foreign 
asset and the other included foreign reserves. 
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A. Net foreign asset to M2 ratio 
I used the ratio of M2 to net foreign asset (IFS CD-ROM line 31N) as a proxy 
for international liquidity. M2 is calculated as the sum of money (IFS CD-ROM 
line 34)and quasi-money (IFS CD-ROM line 35). 
N.F.A/M2 = Net foreign asset/M2 (A.4) 
B. Foreign reserves to M2 ratio 
I used the ratio of M2 to total reserves minus gold (IFS CD-ROM line ILd) as 
a proxy for reserve adequacy. M2 was calculated as the sum of money (IFS CD-
ROM line 34) and quasi-money (IFS CD-ROM line 35). Since total reserves minus 
gold is measured in million of SDRs, we converted it to national currencies unit 
by using the monthly exchange rate between SDRs and national currency. (IFS 
CD-ROM line rf) 
Foreign reserves/M2 = Total reserves minus gold/M2 (A.5) 
5. Current Account to GDP ratio 
Current account data is available from IFS CD-ROM (line 78al). Share of cur-
rent account to GDP (IFS CD-ROM line 99B) in each month during the peg is 
calcualted. 
6. Inflation Differential 
I calculated the change in CPI (IFS CD-ROM line 64) as a measure of inflation 
rate. We calculate the year to year change in CPI monthly in order to obtain 
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the monthly inflation rate. For example, monthly inflation rate for July 1997 
is calculate by comparing July 1997 CPI with July 1996 CPI. Monthly data for 
inflation differential is calculated by substructing the monthly US inflation rate 
by the monthly inflation rate in the Asian countries. For example, inflation dif-
ferential between Thailand and United Stated is calculated by Thailand inflation 
rate minus the U.S. inflation rate in monthly basis. 
A.2 Results of Klein and Marion (1997) 
Here, I included the results form Klein and Marion (1997) for comparison purpose. 
Table A.l provides information about 61 peg spells in Latin American countries. Table 
A.2 reports estimates with all identified variables and country dummies. Table A.3 
reports estimates with change in foreign assets. Table A.4 reports estimates with time 
on peg subsample and time on peg dummy variables. Table A.5 reports the estimated 
probabilies of devaluation by number of months before actual devaluation. 
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Table A.l: Summary Statistics 
Number of pegs 61 
Mean duration in months (standard deviation) 32.2 (49.5) 
Median duration of months 10 
Mean value for openness (standard deviation) 21.6 (12.5) 
Mean value for trade concentration with U.S.(standard deviation) 30.8 (13.5) 
Average monthly rate of change of bilateral real exchange rate to USD index -3.9% 





Costa Rica 1 
Dominican Republic 3 
Ecuador 7 









1. Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; International 
Monetary Fund, Directions of Trade. 
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Table A.2: Estimates with all identified variables and country dummies 
Variables Specification a Specification b 
In{R.E.R)us -2.48** (0.59) -3.10** ( 0 . 7 5 ) ^ 
Openness -0.06** (0.01) -0.009 (0.03) 
Trade Concus 0.033** (0.014) 0.029 (0.038) 
N.F.A/M2 -0.015** (0.003) -0.016** (0.005) 
Time on peg -0.03** (0.01) -0.015* (0.009) 
Time on peg: 0.00014** (0.00003) 0.00006 (0.00004) 
Multiple ER 0.17 (0.36) 0.42 (0.54) 
Reg.exec.transfers 1.27* (0.66) 1.22* (0.74) 
Coups 1.49* (0.75) 1.93** (0.82) 
Pseudo li^ ^ ^ 
Number of observations 1738 1738 
Number of pegs 61 61 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Specification a does not include any country variables, specification b does. 
3. Multiple ER stands for multiple exchange rate. Reg.exec.transfers stands for 
regular executive transfer. Coups stands for irregular executive transfer. 
4. * = Significant at 10% level. 
5. ** = Significant at 5% level. 
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Table A.3: Estimates with a change in foreign assets 
Variables Specification c Specification d 
In(R.E.R)us -1.45** (0.58) -1.50** (0.58) 
In(Foreign reserves/M2) -0.58** (0.19) -0.54** (0.19) 
d{In{foregin reserves/M2)) -0.28 (0.74) 
Openness -0.018 (0.012) -0.019 (0.012) 
Trade Concus 0 .028** (0 .014) 0 .030** (0.014) 
Time on peg -0.04** (0.01) -0.037** (0.01) 
Time on peg) 0.00014** (0.00003) 0.00014** (0.00003) 
Multiple ER -0.59** (0.31) -0.56* (0.31) 
Reg.exec.transfers 1.20* (0.64) 1.17* (0.65) 
Coups 1.40** (0.72) 1.39** (0.72) 
Pseudo li^ ^ K U 
Number of observations 1821 1808 
Number of pegs 61 61 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Specification c uses logarithm of foreign reserves to M2 ratio instead of foreign 
reserves to M2 ratio, is otherwise the same as Specification a. 
3. Specification d adds one more variable, which is change in logarithm of foreign 
reserves to M2 ratio on Specification c. 
4. Multiple ER stands for multiple exchange rate. Reg.exec.transfers stands for 
regular executive transfer. Coups stands for irregular executive transfer. 
5. * = Significant at 10% level. 
6. ** = Significant at 5% level. 
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Table A.4: Estimates with time on peg subsample and time on peg dummy variables 
Variables Specification e Specification f Specification g 
Full Sample 1st 6 months 1st 12 months 
In{R.E.R)us 2.19** (0.60) -2.91* (1.55) -2.00** (0.83) 
N.F.A./M2 -0.012** (0.003) -0.016** (0.006) -0.014** (0.004) 
Openness -0.05** (0.015) -0.059** (0.03) -0.054** (0.02) 
Trade Concus 0.017 (0.014) 0.048 (0.032) 0.024 (0.020) 
Time on peg -0.012 (0.011) -4.30 (3.19) 0.77 (0.52) 
Time on pecf 0.00005 (0.00004) 0.4 (0.29) -0.05 (0.033) 
Multiple ER 0.06 (0.40) 0.010 (0.65) 0.06 (0.49) 
Reg.exec.transfers 1.31* (0.69) 0.59 (2.13) 2.16** (1.09) 
Coups 1.81** (0.74) 
1980 dummy 1.02** (0.35) 0.05 (0.68) 0.34 (0.46) 
Months 4 - 6 0.20 (0.56) 
Months 7 - 9 1.10** (0.49) 
Months 10 - 12 0.51 (0.58) 
Pseiido i?；^  ^ ^ 
Number of observations 1738 197 376 
Number of pegs 61 61 61 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Specification e consists 3 dummies for month 4-6, month 7-9 and month 10-12. 
3. Specification f consists data from the first 6 months of each spell only. 
4. Specification g consists data from the first 12 months of each spell only. 
5. * 二 Significant at 10% level. 
6. ** = Significant at 5% level. 
Table A.5: Estimated probabilities of devaluation by number of months before actual 
devaluation  
Probabilities Months before actual devaluation 
F u l l S a m p l e ~ 6 I 5 I 4 I 3 I 2 I 1 
Mean K m O m ^ H i 0 . 1 9 
St.Dev 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.24 
Av'g % Ch. 17% 8% 38% 39% 13% 61% 
Median 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 
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